This appendix consists of three sections. In Section A, we revisit the assumption (considered in the main body of the paper) that the availability of promotion is certain. We show that the results do not change when the availability of promotion is assumed to be uncertain. In Section B, we revisit the assumption (considered in the main body of the paper) that the monetary saving is smaller than the deviation from the reference price. We show that the results do not change when the saving is assumed to be larger than the deviation. In Section C, we provide a numerical calibration of the reference-price deviation within which the relative-thinking effect reverses.
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A. ANALYSIS FOR THE CASE OF UNCERTAIN PROMOTION AT STORE 2
In the main body of the paper, we assumed that the consumer at Store 1 considers the promotion (x) at Store 2 to be certain. Here, we briefly consider the case where the availability of promotion at Store 2 is uncertain, and let us denote this uncertainty byψ . (Uncertainty in the magnitude of the promotion can also be considered similarly.) A customer at Store 1 believes that with probability 1 < ψ , there exists a promotion x at Store 2, and with probability (1-ψ ), that there is no promotion. If a ≤ 0, that is, when faced with a lower-than-expected price at Store 1, the customer would go to Store 2 to receive an (uncertain) saving of x if: r r Store 2offers promotion Store 2does not offer promotion
In other words, if a ≤ 0, the probability that the consumer will go to Store 2 will be:
Price Saving Gain Enhancement
Pr(Purchase at Store 2 / a 0)
Notice that (W1) is analogous to equation (8) 
Again, (W2) is analogous to equation (9). Therefore, both equations above are similar to the ones in the paper, except for the scaling factor ψ . In fact, when faced with uncertainty ψ , the range (x, * a ] in which the referent-thinking effect is dominant would be exactly the same as in the case when no uncertainty exists. In Section (C), we rely on equations (8) and (9) from the paper to numerically calibrate * a , the point at which relative thinking reverses to referent thinking. The same * a will be obtained using the above equations (W1 and W2) because the scaling factor ψ is common across the two equations.
B. ANALYSIS FOR THE CASE OF X > A
As explained in the main body of the paper, our focus has been on the case of x a ≤ , that is, when the monetary saving accrued to a consumer is small compared to the deviation from the reference price. For this case, we showed that the relative-thinking effect-consumers being more willing to seek a bargain on low rather than high prices-can be reversed. Specifically, when actual prices are in the region around the reference price (i.e., deviation occurs but is not extreme), the referent-thinking effect arises. In this section, we show that this reversal replicates even when x > a, that is, when the monetary saving accrued to a consumer is large compared to the deviation from the reference price.
The overall utility associated with a purchase involving an actual price payment of a p at Store 1 is given by:
If the consumer buys from Store 2, her overall utility is given by:
Equation W4 is analogous to the equation 6 in the paper. But notice here that since x is greater than a, the consumer who was incurring a loss at Store 1 (a>0) would now be in the gain condition at Store 2.
Using the analysis performed in the paper, we can derive the probability that the consumer will go to Store 2 as follows: Clearly, in this case, Pr(Purchase at Store 2 / a 0) > > Pr(Purchase at Store 2 / a 0) ≤ since 0 λ > . Also, because we have shown that the referent effect increases faster as a goes up, this reversal continues to hold as a goes up. Notice that the upper bound of a is x, so we can say that for a (0, x] ∈ , the relative-thinking effect is dominated by the referent-thinking effect.
Taking the above results together with the results presented in the main body of the paper, we conclude that the referent-thinking effect dominates the relative-thinking effect in the region around the reference price, irrespective of whether x is smaller than a, or larger. Pr(Purchase at Store 2 / a 0) > > Pr(Purchase at Store 2 / a 0) ≤ .
C. NUMERICAL CALIBRATION OF
The cut-off point * a that determines the reversal is given by the following equation:
The above equation, W8, is highly non-linear and a closed form solution for this is not feasible, but a close approximation of the solution can be obtained using Taylor 
